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ABSTRACT
Union Wages and the Minimum Wage
Henry S. Farber
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
It is argued that a change in the minimum wage may affect the
outcomes of collective bargaining through its effect on a
hypothetical "reference wage" which the union rank-and-file use as
a basis of comparison in formulating their wage demand. It is
further argued that the importance of the minimum wage in the
reference wage is stronger for collective bargaining relationships
which have base wage rates relatively close to the minimum wage.
In order to investigate these hypotheses empirically and to
measure the effect of changes in the minimum wage on the wage and
strike outcomes of collective bargaining, a sample of 209
contracts representing nineteen collective bargaining
relationships over the period from 1957 through 1979 was
formulated. The results of the empirical analysis suggest that
changes in the minimum wage have an effect on negotiated wage
changes which is quite small and, given the precision with which
it is estimated, which is unlikely to be of substantial magnitude.
Even for relationships with base wage rates only 10 percent above
the minimum wage the elasticity of union wages with respect to a
change in the minimum is less than .05. This small effect
declines further as the base wage increases relative to the
minimum. No systematic relationship could be found between
changes in the minimum wage and the likelihood or duration of
strikes. However, these results were rather poorly determined,
and further theoretical and empirical analysis of the determinants
of strike activity in general is needed before conclusions can be
drawn with confidence.
In order to investigate a potential mechanism through which
changes in the minimum wage might affect the outcomes of
collective bargaining, an Ashenf elter-Johnson type model of
outcomes was developed and implemented. However, data constraints
forced the elimination of the four lowest wage relationships from
the sample which reduced its usefulness in an investigation of the
effects of changes in the minimum wage. Nonetheless, two
interesting tentative results relating to the minimum wage were
found. First, no systematic relationship could be found between
changes in the minimum wage and union wage demands while changes
in a manufacturing average hourly earnings measure were found to
have a substantial impact on union wage demands. Second, it was
found in the context of the model that the level of the minimum
wage relative to the base wage is an important determinant of the
alternative wage available to workers. Since this quantity
governs the ultimate concessions the union will make, it can have
an important effect on outcomes. More specifically, it is likely
that a change in the minimum wage increases wage settlements
somewhat as the base wage rises to reassert partially the old
union-minimum wage differential. There may also be a reduction in
strike activity.
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I . Introduction
While most research by economists on the minimum wage
addresses its potential employment effects, an important (and
relatively neglected) issue concerns the effect of changes in the
minimum wage on other wages in general and on the wage negotiated
by unions in particular. Gramlich (1976) found that average
hourly earnings in the private sector had an impact elasticity of
.027 with respect to a change in the minimum wage. In a recent
study Grossman (1980) found a somewhat more substantial effect of
changes in the minimum wage on the earnings of workers who earned
close to the minimum wage. However, neither of these studies
address the issue of how changes in the minimum wage affect wages
in the union sector through the collective bargaining process. It
is this problem which serves as the focus of this study.
There are at least two plausible explanations which can be
developed for an effect of changes in the minimum wage on wage
changes negotiated by labor unions. The first is termed here the
reference wage theory. This theory posits that unions are
concerned not only about the real wages of their members but also
about the wages of their members relative to the earnings of some
reference group. This concept is argued for persuasively by Ross
(1948). More recently Mitchell (1980) has discussed what he terms
"wage imitation" particularly within the union sector between
various collective bargaining relationships.
A particular wage (or more plausibly, combination of wages)
may become the reference wage for a particular collective
bargaining relationship for any of a number of reasons. For
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example, the union workers may consider workers who earn the
reference wage (or wages) to be comparable in some dimension
(e.g., skill level or residential neighborhood) and demand parity-
through some sort of equity argument. More generally union
workers may perceive that a fixed relationship with workers who
earn the reference wage (or wages) is equitable and demand that
this fixed relationship be maintained. The reference wage concept
may also be rooted in union workers' perceptions of the wages
associated with their alternative employment opportunities. The
reference wage for a particular group may not be the wage earned
by a particular worker, but it may be an average of the wages
earned by a relevant reference group.
Changes in the minimum wage can affect union wages to the
extent that the minimum wage is represented in the reference wage.
It is clear that the reference wage in relatively low wage
collective bargaining relationships ought to be more dependent on
the minimum wage than the reference wage in higher wage collective
bargaining relationships. Thus, an important empirical
implication of the model is that any effect of changes in the
minimum wage on negotiated wage rates will diminish as one
progresses upward through the wage structure.
The second explanation which can be developed for an effect
of changes in the minimum wage on wage changes negotiated by labor
unions is that the minimum wage can serve as a wage floor for
potential nonunion competition. Given the higher wages negotiated
by unions this will limit the amount by which nonunion firms can
undercut the costs of union firms. The result will be that the
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long run employment effect of any union wage demand is smaller in
an environment which includes a minimum wage, and unions may then
be free to negotiate higher wages . ^ This "wage floor" theory has
the implication that the importance of the minimum wage as a wage
floor in the context of a particular collective bargaining
relationship is higher in those situations where the workers are
earning close to the minimum wage. Thus, as with the reference
wage theory, the wage floor theory has the empirical implication
that any effect of the minimum wage on negotiated wage rates will
diminish as one progresses upward through the wage structure.
In the remainder of this study the reference wage concept
will be used as the basis for the analysis. However, in light of
the above discussion it is clear that both the reference wage
theory and the wage floor theory have similar empirical
implications regarding the effect of the minimum v/age on union
wages and that the expositional choice made here is somewhat
arbitrary.
The appropriate data for analysis of the effect of changes in
minimum wages on union wages are data on the outcomes of
collective bargaining disaggregated to the level at which
negotiations take place. To this end the empirical analysis
presented below relies on information on nineteen collective
bargaining relationships from 1954 through 1979. The particular
relationships selected represent a broad spectrum of the wage
structure from relatively low paid textile workers to more highly
paid automobile workers. The data set is described in detail in
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the next section along with the development of an empirical
representation of the reference wage concept.
Section III contains the development of a microeconoraic
empirical relationship which relates the wage changes negotiated
in a collective bargaining relationship to such things as the
unemployment rate and expectations regarding inflation as well as
to changes in the reference wage. The empirical results presented
in that section suggest that even in relatively low wage
situations changes in the minimum wage have only a small effect on
the negotiated wage changes and that this small effect diminishes
in higher wage situations.
In Section IV a link is drawn between the wage demand of a
union and the potential for an employer to dissipate some of the
wage demand by withstanding a strike. A reduced form tobit model
of the occurrence of strikes is formulated and estimated. In
general, the model exhibits little explanatory power and no
significant relationship is found between changes in the minimum
wage and the probability or duration of a strike.
Section V contains the development and implementation of a
structural model of the outcome of industrial disputes which is
based on the work of Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969). The
simultaneous determination of wage and strike outcomes of
collective bargaining is the focus of the theoretical and
empirical analysis in this section. Unfortunately, the data
requirements of this model forced the elimination from the sample
of four of the low wage firms so that the results in this section
are less useful than one would like in determining the potential
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effects of changes in the minimum wage on wage demands and strike
activity. However, it is tentatively concluded in the context of
the model that, while changes in the minimum wage have little
discernable impact on the level of union wage demands, the level
of the minimum wage relative to the union wage has a substantial
effect on the wage alternatives available to union workers. This
implies that it is through this route that a change in the minimum
wage can affect the wage and strike outcomes of collective
bargaining
.
In the final section the results of the study are summarized.
It is concluded on the basis of the empirical analysis that, while
changes in the minimum wage have only a small effect on union
wages, the latter are substantially influenced by changes in
average earnings in manufacturing. In addition, to the extent
that changes in the minimum wage are the result of changes in
average earnings in manufacturing, even the small direct effect of
changes in minimum wage on union wages which was found in Section
III may actually be an indirect effect of changes in average
earnings.
II. The Data
The nineteen collective bargaining relationships listed in
table 1 were selected in order to represent a wide range of base
wage rates varying from near the minimum wage to over twice the
minimum wage.^ Data availability was a major factor in
determining the pool from which the relationships were selected.
The majority of the nineteen relationships were the subjects of
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Wage Chronologies published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). The natural unit of observation is a contract rather than
an arbitrary time unit such as a year, and the sample consists of
209 contracts covering the nineteen relationships over the period
from 1954 to 1979. Eighteen of the nineteen relationships in the
sample are in the manufacturing sector, and they are broadly
representative of the unionized portion of that sector. Thus,
while any results derived from this sample can be generalized to
the unionized manufacturing sector as a whole, caution must be
exercised in extrapolating any results to other sectors such as
the service or construction sectors. This limitation is
particularly important in light of the unique nature of the
collective bargaining process in industries such as construction.
Given the range of wage rates specified in any collective
bargaining agreement it is necessary to select a single wage rate
which can serve as a basis for comparison both over time and
between firms insofar as possible. The .janitor's wage was
selected because of its availability for a large number of the
firms. Any other occupational wage has the drawback that the
occupation is not likely to be common to very many industries.
Where the janitor's wage was not available the plant minimum
regular wage rate was selected. ^ The particular wage rate
selected will be referred to as the base wage.
In order to illustrate the broad spectrum of wage rates
represented in the sample table 2 contains for each relationship
over the 1954-1979 period the average of the differential between
the base wage and the minimum wage existing prior to negotiation
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of each contract.*^ The base wage in four of the firms is less
than twenty percent above the minimum on average over the sample
period while in five of the firms the base wage is over twice the
minimum wage on average. In the remaining ten firms the base wage
rate is between twenty and onehundred percent above the minimum
wage on average. Note that use of the base wage, which is at the
bottom of the intra-firm wage structure, for this calculation
results in a systematic understatement of the differential between
the average wage in the firm and the minimum wage. Nontheless,
the differential between the base wage and the minimum is a good
indicator of the relative positions of the various intra-firm wage
structures vis a vis the minimum wage.
The wage change measure which is used to represent the wage
outcome of collective bargaining in this study is the average
annual proportional change in the base wage negotiated at the time
of contract expiration excluding any cost-of-living escalator
adjustments. In other words this is the noncontingent (on prices)
rate of wage increase. More formally, this measure is calculated
as
\
W - W
n
—
w
—
'^ (1)DUR
where W represents the average annual rate of change of the base
wage which is negotiated, W represents the base wage rate which
will prevail at expiration of the new contract (excluding any
cost-of-living adjustments), W represents the base wage rate
which prevails at expiration of the old contract, and DUR
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represents the duration of the new contract in months. The
quantity W is used as a proxy for negotiated changes in the
general intra-firm level of wages, and it will be an accurate
proxy to the extent that the intra-firm wage structures are stable
over time. It is recognized that some compression of these wage
structures has taken place due to the use of "across the board"
absolute cents per hour wage increases. However, this tendency is
offset in many instances through the negotiation periodically of
special increases for the more highly skilled groups. On balance,
given the limitations of the data it is argued that ^ accurately
reflects the negotiated noncontingent general rate of wage
increase.
An important component of the empirical analysis is a
variable representing expectations about the rate of price
inflation over the new contract. The relevant price index to form
expectations on is the consumer price index (CPI) because the
parties (particularly the workers) are exposed to its well
publicized movements and because most escalator clauses are linked
to the CPI. The expectations series was formulated using a
straightforward autoregression on annual rates of change in the
CPI in the postwar period. More specifically, for a contract
being negotiated in month j of year t, the j to j annual rate of
change in the CPI from 1947 to t was regressed on lagged j to j
changes in the CPI and a constant. ^ The length of the lag
depended on t. From 1954 through 1957 only one lag was included,
from 1958 through 1965 two lags wore included, and from 1966
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through 1979 three lags were included. This procedure is somewhat
arbitrary, but the results are not very sensitive to variations in
the lag structure . ^
The resulting set of forecasting equations was then used to
form expectations about the rate of inflation. To forecast the
rate of inflation over the life of the new contract, sequential
annual forecasts were made. First, using actual data available at
the time of negotiation, the appropriate autoregression was used
to formulate an expected rate of inflation over the next year
•1 •!
(p ). If the contract was longer than one year, p was used as a
datum in the same autoregression to compute an expected rate of
inflation over the second year (p ). For longer contracts this
process was continued until enough yearly expected rates of
inflation had been computed. Finally, these expectations were
converted to an average annual expected rate of change over the
1 °
new contract (p ) by computing p = —q- I (1 *"?„) - 1 where D
represents the duration of the new contract in years. For
contracts which are not of year multiple duration, p was computed
for the two years bracketing the actual duration and the correct
p was computed by linear interpolating between these values.
The central empirical construct for the analysis of the
effect of changes in the minimum wage on union negotiated base
wage rates is the reference wage (W^). It is assumed here that
the reference wage for a bargaining relationship is a weighted
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geometric average of the minimum wage and average hourly earnings
in durable goods manufacturing. The latter was chosen to be
representative of the earnings of workers at the high end of the
blue collar wage spectrum.^ The logarithm of the reference wage
is represented formally as
in Vl^ = a Zn W^ + (1-a) in W^^ (2)
where W represents the minimum wage, W„ represents average hourly
earnings in durable goods manufacturing, and a is the weight put
on the minimum wage. It was argued that this weight is an inverse
function of the differential between the minimum wage and base
wage of workers at the time of negotiations (W ). Let
a=a^+ar,A (3)
W - W
where A = r- and is the differential between the base
m
wage and the minimum wage. The hypothesis that the effect of the
minimum wage on the reference wage diminishes as the base wage of
the workers become large relative to W is embodied in the^ m
empirical specification as the hypothesis that a„ < 0.
The proportional change in the reference wage over a span of
time can be approximated by taking the total differential of
equation (2). Neglecting any change in a this is
d£n W„ = a dto W + (1-a) d£n W„. (4)R m ^ ^ H ^ ^
In the next section it will become clear that in determining the
rate of wage increase negotiated at a point in time a relevant
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variable is the rate of change in the reference wage over the
previous contract. This variable is called W„ and can beK
represented as
where W represents the average annual rate of change in W overm ^^ m
the previous contract and W represents the average annual rate of
change in W over the previous contract. Rearrangement of terms
in equation (5) and substitution for a from equation (3) yields
This empirical representation is used in the analysis in the
succeeding sections.
Table 3 contains the means and standard deviations of the
variables used in this study for the sample of 209 contracts
described above. Strikes occurred during the negotiation of 34 of
the 209 contracts, and the average duration of a strike where one
occurred was .118 years (43 days). Cost-of-living adjustment
clauses were included in 46 of the 209 contracts.
III. Changes in the Minimum Wage and Negotiated Wage Changes
The observed wage and strike outcomes of collective
bargaining can be considered to be the result of a process by
which union wage demands are translated through the bargaining
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process into these outcomes. A version of this model is developed
formally in Section V. In this section the observed wage outcomes
are modelled as a reduced form relationship between W and
exogenous variables which affect the wage demands of the union.
Some of these variables also reflect the willingness of employers
to accede to such demands. The resulting reduced form looks very
much like a microeconomic analogue of an aggregate Phillips
Curve relationship, but it must be remembered that the theoretical
justification and the interpretation of this microeconomic
relationship is somewhat different.
Before consideration of the reference wage hypotheses, a
plausible specification is
W^ = 3o + 3^UR + ^^mCE + e3(NES)p^ + e^(ES)p + Zy + e (7)
where e is a random component, Zy is a linear combination of
dichotomous variables for periods with incomes policies (G, PHI,
PH3), and the rest of the variables are defined in Table 3.
Intuitively, the unemployment rate is an indicator of general
labor market conditions which may be important to the union's
ability to negotiate a higher wage. For instance, if the
unemployment rate is low then union workers may have better job
alternatives, they may be able to locate temporary work more
easily during a strike, and employers may have difficulty finding
alternative workers. The rate of change of real wages over the
previous contract (RWCH) is a "catchup" variable which reflects a
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union's desire to make up for a decline in real wages which
occurred over the previous contract. Similarly, if real wages
have been rising rapidly then union wage demands may be moderated.
It is expected that the coefficient on RWCH will be negative.
Separate coefficients are estimated on the expected inflation
variable for indexed and nonindexed contracts. This is necessary
because the dependent variable is the noncontingent (on prices)
negotiated rate of wage increase rather than the total realized ex
post rate of wage increase. Clearly, the parties must be more
concerned about the expected rate of inflation if the contract is
not indexed than they must be if the contract is indexed. For
indexed contracts the rate of inflation affects the wage
independently of the negotiated rate of wage increase. Hence, it
is expected that the coefficient of p for indexed contracts (3^)
e 4
will be smaller than the coefficient of p for nonindexed
^e
contracts (Bo) and that the difference (Bo - B4) will reflect the
average perceived degree of wage indexation in indexed contracts
as it affects wage outcomes.
The first column of Table 4 contains the results of an
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of equation (7) over the
sample of 209 contracts. With the exception of the positive
coefficient on the unemployment rate, the results accord with
(Expectations. In particular, the effect of the expected rate of
inflation on the negotiated proportional wage increase is positive
but smaller in indexed contracts than in nonindexed contracts.
The difference between the coefficients which represents the
degree to which indexation obviates the necessity for the union to
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consider the expected rate of inflation in negotiating a wage
change is estimated to be .649 - .250 = .399 with a standard error
of .0836. The hypothesis that these coefficients are identical
can be rejected at any reasonable level of significance. The
coefficient of RWCH is estimated to be negative as expected, and
the hypothesis that it is equal to zero can be rejected at the 10
percent level of significance. The Kennedy-Johnson guidelines
variable (G) has a negative coefficient which is significantly
less than zero at the 5 percent level. Its magnitude suggests
that, on average, negotiated wage changes were 1.2 percent lower
than they would otherwise have been. The Nixon-Ford controls
variables (PHI, PH3) are of unconsequential magnitude with small
standard errors.
The coefficient on the unemployment rate is positive and
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. This is
the opposite of the expected result, and it suggests that wage
changes in the union sector, more than being less susceptible than
nonunion wage changes to moderation by a loose labor market, are
actually higher when the labor market is slack. As to the
practical significance of this positive effect, it is actually
quite small. The point estimate of .09 suggests that if the
unemployment rate doubles from 4 percent to 8 percent union
negotiated wage changes will increase by only .36 percentage
points
.
The well known instability of the aggregate Phillips Curve
relationship after approximately 1970 suggests that the perverse
relationship between union negotiated wage changes and the
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unemployment rate may be a result of some structural shift which
took place after 1970. In order to investigate this conjecture
equation (7) was re-estimated using only the 150 contracts
negotiated prior to 1971. The results of this estimation are
contained in the second column of Table 4. The results are
remarkably similar to those computed from the entire sample of 209
contracts, and the positive relationship between W and the
unemployment rate clearly existed prior to the I970's. In order
to perform an F-test of the hypothesis that the structure did not
shift in the 1970's, equation (7) was also re-estimated over the
post-1970 period. These results were not terribly well determined
due to the relatively small number of observations (59), and the
hypothesis of structural stability could be rejected at the 5
percent level of significance.^ However, it is clear from the
relationship estimated over the contracts negotiated prior to 1971
that this structural instability cannot account for the positive
relationship between the unemployment rate and W .
A second potential explanation for the positive coefficient
on the unemployment rate is that the demographic composition of
the labor force shifted toward groups with relatively higher
unemployment rates over the sample period . Given that the
negotiated rates of wage increase were increasing secularly over
the sample period and if the aggregate unemployment rate is not
the appropriate measure of "slack" in the labor market, the
estimated coefficient may be an upward biased indicator of the
effect of the state of the labor market on negotiated wage
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outcomes.^ In particular, if the appropriate measure of the state
of the labor market is the unemployment rate of a
particular demographic group (e.g., prime age males) then use of
the aggregate unemployment rate will be misleading because the
latter is drifting steadily upward over time relative to the
unemployment rate of the subgroup.
In order to evaluate this explanation empirically equation
(7) was re-estimated using the unemployment rate for prime age
males in place of the aggregate unemployment rate. The results,
presented in the third column of table 4, suggest that this
explanation has some validity. The estimated coefficient on the
prime age male unemployment rate is significantly less than zero
at the 1 percent level. The estimated coefficients of the other
variables are virtually unchanged from those contained in the
first column of table 4. Column (4) of table 4 contains estimates
of equation (7) where both unemployment rates are included. It is
interesting to note that both unemployment rates have coefficients
which are significantly different from zero but with opposite
signs. The aggregate unemployment rate has a positive coefficient
while the prime-age male unemployment rate has a negative
coefficient. Again, the estimated coefficients of the other
variables are virtually unchanged from those contained in the
first column of table 4.
Given the lack of a clear theoretical guide concerning the
appropriate measure of slack in the labor market, the analysis
proceeds using the aggregate unemployment rate. However, because
of this ambiguity all of the relationships estimated in the
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remainder of this study were also estimated using the prime age
male unemployment rate. Apart from the opposing signs of the two
unemployment rate variables none of the other estimated
coefficients in any of the models considered below was changed to
any meaningful degree by the specification of the unemployment
rate variable, and for this reason only the estimates using
aggregate unemployment rate are presented in the succeeding work.
In order to consider the reference wage hypothesis equation
(7) is modified to include W„ as a regressor. This is
W^ = Pq + B^UR + BgRWCH + 32(NES)p^ +
34(ES)p^ + B^W^ + Zy + e. (8)
However, W_ is not observable so that it is necessary to use the
K
empirical representation of W defined in equation (6). The
resulting estimating equation is
W = 6_ + 6,UR + 3„RWCH + 6„(NES)p^
n 1 ^ o e
+ B4(ES)p^ + B5*jj + Bg(l^^ - \) + B^C*^ - Wjj)A + Zy + e (9)
where the variables are defined in Table 3. From equation (6) it
is clear that the coefficient B^ represents the elasticity of the
union negotiated wage with respect to a change in the reference
wage. The ratio -r^- represents the coefficient a, which is the
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weight, defined in equation (3), of the minimum wage in the
reference wage where the union wage is equal to the minimum wage
(A = 0). The ratio -— represents the coefficient a^, which
measures the decline in the weight of the minimum wage in the
reference wage as the union wage increases relative to the minimum
wage
.
The first column of Table 5 contains OLS estimates of
equation (9). Setting aside the reference wage variables for the
moment, the estimated coefficients are similar to those contained
in Table 4. The unemployment rate again is estimated to have a
positive coefficient of approximately .1 which is significantly
different from zero at the 5 percent level . It is interesting
that, while the estimated coefficients on the inflation
expectations variables are substantially smaller than those
contained in Table 4, the difference between them (e„ - g.) is
estimated to be approximately the same. This difference is .194 -
(-.210) = .404 with a standard error of .0784. Again, the
hypothesis that the coefficients are identical ( Bo = 3^) can bo
rejected at any reasonable level of significance.
The hypothesis that the reference wage variables (W„, W - ^^
,
(W - W„)A) all have coefficients of zero can be rejected at any
reasonable level of significance using an F-test.^° However, it
is clear from the coefficients and their standard errors that the
majority of the explanatory power is coming from the rate of
change of average hourly earnings in durable goods manuf acturin;^
(W^) rather than from the rate of change of the minimum wage (W ).
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The elasticity of the union negotiated wage with respect to a
change in W^ is 3^ - gg -B^A. This is .704 with a standard error
of .146 where the base wage is ten percent above the minimum wage
dW
r
dW,
(A =.1). Table 6 contains the value of with its associated
H
standard error for various values of the differential of the base
wage from the minimum wage (A). The large and well determined
coefficient on W suggests that changes in W over the previous
contract (and indirectly changes in the reference wage) are
important determinants of union negotiated wage changes.
Table 6 also contains estimates of the effect of changes in
dW^
the minimum wage on union negotiated wage changes ( ) using the
dW
m
coefficient estimates contained in the first column of Table 5.
As expected the effect is positive for contracts with base wage
rates near the minimum and it declines as the base wage is farther
from the minimum (B_ < 0). For contracts with base wage rates
within approximately twenty percent of the minimum (A < .2), the
dW
effect ( = Bp. + Br^A) is statistically significantly greater
d^ ^ '
m
than zero at the ten percent level
.
While the estimated elasticity of the negotiated wage with
respect to changes in the minimum wage is of the appropriate sign,
-20-
dW
its magnitude is small relative to . The elasticity is .044
dW„
with a standard error of .034 where the base wage is ten percent
above the minimum (A = .1) and it decreases to -.002 with a
standard error of .029 where the base wage is twice the minimum
(A = 1). These estimates are so small as to make the effect of
charges in the minimum wage on union negotiated wages of little
practical importance. To illustrate this note that the largest
proportional increase in the minimum wage over the sample period
(1954 - 1979) was less than 35 percent. Even where the base wage
is only ten percent above the minimum, an increase in the minimum
wage of 35 percent would increase the union negotiated wage by
only 1.5 percent.
It is important to note that the estimated elasticities are
not only small but also are estimated quite precisely. It is
unlikely that the effect of changes in the minimum wage on union
negotiated wage changes is substantial. The upper limits of a 95
dW
r
dW
percent confidence interval on —— is .111 where A = .1 which
m
implies that at that wage level an increase in W of 35 percent
m ^
would increase the union wage by 3.9 percent. For a base wage of
twice the minimum (A = 1), the upper limit of a 95% confidence
dW
interval on —— is .054 which implies that at that
m
-21-
wage level an Increase in W of 35 percent would increase the
union wage by 1.9 percent.
In the context of the reference wage theory, it can be
inferred from the coefficient estimates both that changes in the
reference wage are important determinants of union negotiated wage
changes and that the reference wage is heavily weighted toward the
AHE measure rather than toward the minimum wage even for
relatively low wage contracts. The first point is supported by
the evidence that the coefficient of W„ (Be-) in the regression of
•
W is interpreted as the elasticity of W with respect to changes
in the reference wage (W ). The estimates contained in the first
n
column of Table 5 suggest that this elasticity is .748 with a
standard error of .140. The hypothesis that B_ = can be
rejected at any reasonable level of significance.
The second point, that changes in the reference wage are
relatively unaffected by changes in the minimum wage, can be
illustrated by computing the weight (a) on the minimum wage in the
reference wage equation. The third column of Table 6 contains the
values of a computed for various values of A. This weight is .059
for contracts with a base wage ten percent above the minimum, and
it falls to zero for contracts with a base wage of twice the
minimum. Correspondingly, the weight on W^ in the reference wage
equation (1-a) is .941 for contracts with a base wage ten percent
above the minimum, and this rises to one for contracts with a base
wage of twice the minimum.
A caveat to the conclusion that union wage changes are not
greatly affected by changes in the minimum wage is that almost by
-22-
definition it cannot be true for union workers who earn
approximately the minimum wage (A = 0). The wages of these
workers must rise essentially one for one with increases in the
minimum wage. This is true for legal reasons for workers who are
covered by the minimum wage, and it is true for organizational-
political reasons for all union workers. Clearly, a union will
have trouble justifying its continued existence if it cannot
guarantee its workers some premium (however small) above the
government mandated wage floor. The practical importance of this
issue is limited by the fact that few union workers (particularly
in manufacturing) earn very close to the minimum wage. In the
sample considered here there was no relationship with an average
differential between the base wage and the minimum wage of less
than .1. Nonetheless, when considering unions in relatively low
paid service industries and particularly newly organized unions
these considerations may be of some importance.
While the conclusion that union wage changes are not
substantially affected by changes in the minimum wage can be
tentatively drawn from the empirical results derived above, there
are a number of alternative formulations which must be
investigated before this result can be accepted with some degree
of assurance. The first problem is that, as mentioned above, the
structure may have shifted after 1970 causing the results to be
distorted. In order to investigate this issue the model was re-
estimated using only the 150 contracts negotiated prior to 1971.
These estimates are contained in the second column of Table 5,
and, unlike in the estimation of equation (7), the hypothesis that
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the structure did not shift cannot be rejected at the 5 percent
level of significance.^^ The estimates obtained from the earlier
part of the sample for the effect of changes in the minimum wage
on W are qualitatively similar to those obtained for the entire
dW
sample. The point estimates suggest that —— was somewhat larger
dW
m
prior to 1970, but it was relatively small in magnitude even then.
For contracts with base wages ten percent above the minimum, prior
to 1970 the estimated elasticity of W with respect to changes in
W was .076. If the minimum wage were to increase by 35 percent
this suggests that at A = 1 the union wage would increase by 2.7
percent. These estimates also imply that at A = .1 the weight
.076in Lue rexereiice wcme euuaLion xs —
m
(a) on W^ th f ren ag q t i '
„^^
= .126.
The second potential problem is that, given the pooled nature
of the data set , it may be true that there are unmeasured
influences which are systematic within firms and persist over time
which if not accounted for can distort the results. In order to
investigate this the model was re-estimated using a fixed-effect
framework. Computationally a separate intercept term was
estimated for each firm, and the results of this estimation are
contained in the third column of Table 5. The results are
virtually identical to those obtained for the basic model and
contained in the first clumn of Table 5. Using an F-test, the
hypothesis that the intercept terms are identical across all
nineteen firms cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of
significance. ^^ Thus, it can be concluded that fixed effects are
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not an important factor in the determination of negotiated wage
changes and that their inclusion does not alter the relationship
described above between W and W .
The final potential problem considered here concerns the fact
that certain future changes in the minimum wage are known in
advance because the legislature often passes an amendment to the
Fair Labor Standards Act which specifies that the minimum wage
will increase in a series of steps over the next few years. These
programmed changes may affect the reference wage and hence union
negotiated wage changes even before they become effective. In
order to investigate this issue the model was re-estimated using a
modified minimum wage change variable. This modified
W is defined as the average annual rate of change of the expected
minimum wage where expectations concerning the minimum wage are
confined to previously legislated programmed changes. In other
words, in computing W the parties are assumed to look at what the
minimum wage is programmed to be as of the expiration date of the
contract, and they compare this to what the minimum wage was
programmed (as of the date of negotiation of the last contract) to
be at the expiration of the last contract. The results of the
estimation with this expected W measure are contained in the last
m
column of Table 5, and they are once again qualitatively similar
to those obtained for the basic model. The regression with the
expected W measure implies an even smaller estimated effect of
changes in W on negotiated wage changes than the basic model , and
the results provide little support for the position that ^
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computed from programmed changes is the relevant measure.
Overall, the results presented in this section concerning the
effect of changes in the minimum wage on union negotiated wage
changes are rather clearcut. The point estimate of the effect is
small (an elasticity of approximately .05) even for a base wage
which is fairly close to the minimum and the effect declines to
zero as the base wage grows relative to the minimum. In addition,
the effect is tightly estimated in the sense that there is a
negligible probability that the elasticity of the union wage with
respect to changes in the minimum wage exceeds .15 even for
contracts with a base wage relatively near the minimum. The
results also suggest that changes in average hourly earnings are
much more important at all base wage levels in the determination
of the reference wage and union negotiated wage changes than are
changes in the minimum wage. To the degree that legislated
changes in the minimum wage are the result of changes in AHE, the
latter variable assumes even greater importance in union wage
determination.
IV. Changes in the Minimum Wage and the Occurrence of Strikes
To the extent that changes in the minimum wage increase the
reference wage and to the extent that the union rank-and-file are
concerned about their wage relative to the reference wage, it will
be true that changes in the minimum wage affect union wage
demands. Union wage demands are defined here as that wage
increase which the employer must yield in order to avert a strike.
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If the employer believes that union wage demands can be moderated
by withstanding a strike then the employer, in deciding whether or
not to grant the union wage demand without a strike, faces a
tradeoff between the lost profits incurred during a strike and the
reduction in the present value of future labor costs resulting
from the moderation of union wage demands. Depending on the
nature of this tradeoff an increase in union wage demands (perhaps
caused by an increase in the minimum wage) may increase the
likelihood of a strike.
This hypothesized relationship between union wage demands and
the likelihood of a strike is clearly an oversimplification.
While it is true that the employer faces the sort of tradeoff
described above the key variable is not the level of union wage
demands but it is the rate at which the union can be expected to
moderate those demands during a strike. Intuitively, if the union
doubles its wage demand but is resolved to hold firmly to this new
demand during a strike there will be a negligible benefit to the
employer from withstanding a strike. Conversely, if the union is
seen to lose its "resolve" so that the employer foresees a rapid
moderation of union wage demands during a strike then there will
be a substantial benefit to the employer from withstanding a
strike. A strike will be more likely in the latter case . ^ ^ On
the other hand the level of wage demands may affect the absolute
size of any concession, and to the extent that this is true, an
increase in union demands can increase the likelihood of a
strike. !'
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In the next section a formal structural model of this process
is developed and estimated. In this section an empirical model
relating the set of variables that in the last section was
hypothesized to affect wage outcomes to the length of strike which
occurred in a particular negotiation is developed and estimated.
Both this model and the wage change model estimated in the last
section can be considered reduced form versions of a structural
model which mediates union wage demands through the bargaining
process to yield wage and strike outcomes.
Before proceeding it must be pointed out that strikes, being
costly, are not Pareto efficient, ex post , in the sense that both
parties would have been better off to have settled before any
strike on the same terms. In this context. Hicks (1963) suggests
that strikes are the result of divergent expectations as to the
disagreement outcome. Intuitively, if each party expects the
settlement after a strike to be relatively favorable to its
respective position then neither party may be willing to concede
enough to yield a peaceful settlement. A clear implication of
this interpretation of strikes is that, in the absence of a real
understanding of expectations formation, the likelihood of
occurrence of strikes ought not to be systematically related to
the sorts of variables which were found to affect wage outcomes.
In addition, by this interpretation the reduced form estimation
performed below ought not have much explanatory power.
Strikes occured in negotiating 34 of the 209 contracts in the
sample. The average duration of a strike where one occurred was
.118 years. Given the large number of cases where no strike
-28-
occurred it is necessary to utilize an econometric framework which
explicitly recognizes the truncated nature of the strike
distribution. Suppose that there is a variable, S* , which
represents the "notional" strike length which is defined as
S* = X3 + e . (10)
where X3 is a linear combination of exogenous variables (X) with a
parameter vector (6) and e represents unmeasured determinants of
S*. The observed length of strike (S) is defined as
S = S* if S* >
and (11)
S = if S* < 0.
Assume that e is a random variable distributed normally with
2
mean and variance a . This, together with the definiton of S*
in equation (10), implies that the probability of observing a
1 S — X s
strike of positive length S is (j) ( ^—) where <fi(»)
represents the standard normal probability density function.
—xsAdditionally, the probability of observing no strike is $( ^—)
where *(•) represents the standard normal cumulative distribution
function. The log-likelihood function (L) associated with this
Tobit model for the sample is
n, p n, S- X. e n -X. g
L = - -J— in a + E^ iin(<t)( i
— )) + E Jln(<t«(—i— )) (12)
1=1 i=n.+l
-29-
where i indexes observations, strikes occurred in the first n.
observations and strikes did not occur in the last n-n.
observations. This specification correctly accounts for the fact
that a strike of negative duration is not conceptually meaningful
and that the observations on S are truncated at zero. In terms of
the distribution of e this is accounted for by noting that the
observed values of e are truncated from below at -XB.
In order to obtain estimates of the parameters of the
2
model (B and a ) the log-likelihood function specified in equation
(12) was maximized using an algorithm described in Berndt, Hall,
Hall, and Hausman (1974). The first column of Table 7 contains
estimates of the parameters where the B vector includes a
constant, UR, RWCH, (NES) p , (ES) p , and CON. The latter
variable was not used before, and it is a dichotomous variable
which equals one if the contract was negotiated during the
Kennedy-Johnson guidelines program or during the Nixon-Ford
controls programs and is zero otherwise. ^^ The model does not
seem to have much explanatory power in the sense that a likelihood
ratio test of the hypothesis that all of the elements of the 3
vector are zero except for the constant cannot be rejected at the
ten percent level of significance.^^
Only two coefficients are significantly different from zero
at conventional levels. The coefficient of RWCH is significantly
less than zero at the ten percent level . This suggests that
strikes are both less likely to occur and to be of shorter
duration v/here they do occur when real wages have been rising
rapidly over the last contract. This result is intuitively
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appealing in that one might expect lower demands and less
industrial conflict where the workers have been experiencing a
recent increase in real income.
The coefficient of (NES)p is significantly less than zero at
the five percent level. This suggests that strikes will occur
less frequently and be of shorter duration where contracts are not
indexed and inflation expectations are high. It is also true that
the negative effect of p on strike activity is significantly
larger (in absolute value) at the five percent level where
contracts are not indexed than where they are indexed. The
difference between the relevant coefficients is (-3.41 - (-1.14))
= - 2.27 with an asymptotic standard error of 1.37. These results
do not accord with intuition, and no explanation is offered in
their defense.
The second column of Table 7 contains estimates of the strike
model where the vector of independent variables includes the
additional variables which determine changes in the reference
wage. These are ^„ , (W - W„ ) , and (# - ^„ ) A . Once again, it is
n m n mil
not possible to reject the hypothesis at conventional levels of
significance that all of the elements of B are zero except for the
constant using a likelihood ratio test.^^ In addition, it is not
possible to reject the hypothesis that the three coefficients on
* • • • •
*H ' ^^m ~ ^H^' ^^^ ^^m ~ ^U^^ ^^^ zero using a likelihood ratio
test at conventional levels of significance.^^ As above, the
coefficient on RWCH is significantly less than zero, this time
at the 5 percent level. The nonintuitive result found above that
-31-
the coefficient on (NES)p is significantly less than zero (and
significantly greater in absolute terms than the coefficient of
(ES)p ) does not hold for the model augmented by the W„ variables,
e K
The effect of the rate of change of AHE in durable goods
manufacturing (W„) on strike activity is not significantly
different from zero at the ten percent level where A = 0. The
estimated effect is -2.77 with an asymptotic standard error of
2.28. In addition, its sign is the opposite of what would be
expected if increases in the reference wage increase union wage
demands which in turn increase the likelihood and duration of
strikes
.
The estimated effect of changes in the minimum wage on strike
activity is not significantly different from zero at any
reasonable level for any value of A. While little importance
can be attached to the sign of the estimated effect due to the
size of its standard error, the size of the effect of W on strike
m
activity is the opposite of what the union wage demand theory of
strikes would predict. Given the imprecision with which the
parameters are estimated, it is not possible to draw any
conclusions concerning the effect of changes in the minimum wage
on the likelihood or duration of strikes.
It is clear from the results of this analysis that very
little was found in the way of systematic relationships between
the exogenous variables and the level of strike activity. This
suggests that the reduced form "union wage demand" model of
strikes is inadequate, and that a different approach is required.
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One approach would be to build a "Hicks" type model of strike
based on the divergence of expectations, but it is difficult to
see just what (if any) role changes in the minimum wage would play
in such a model . The approach taken here is to gain some
efficiency in estimating the effects of changes in the minimum
wage on the outcomes of collective bargaining by estimating a
carefully specified structural version of the "union wage demand"
model. This is the subject of analysis in the next section.
V. Structural Model of Wage and Strike Outcomes
The model of the outcomes of collective bargaining described
here was originally developed by Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969)
and has been applied to microeconomic data by Farber (1977, 1978).
The foundation of this model is that in any negotiation the union
has a downward sloping concession schedule which relates the
smallest wage increase acceptable to the union to the length of
strike. This schedule presents the employer with a tradeoff
between increased future labor costs (wage increases) and foregone
current profits (strike). The employer selects the wage-strike
combination which maximizes the firm's present value.
More formally, let the proportional wage increase negotiated
by the union be represented by W. The union has a concession
schedule which determines the smallest W acceptable to the union
at any length of strike (S). A convenient parameterization for
this schedule is
w-33-
W(S) = W^ + (W - W^)e ^^ (13)
here W = ^(«>) which is the minimum wage change the union will
accept even after a very long strike. The quantity 1^„ = W(0)
which is the minimum wage change necessary to avert a strike.
This is what is referred to above as the union wage demand. The
parameter 6 governs the rate of concession of the union. If 1^„ -
W^ is considered to be the maximum possible concession that the
union will make after a very long strike then the quantity
—
t^
represents the "half life" of the concession. In other words this
is the length of strike necessary to reduce the remaining
concession (W(S) - W^ ) by one half. Clearly, the higher is 5 the
shorter is the half life and the union is conceding faster. The
curve in Figure 1 which is convex to the origin represents a
typical concession schedule of the type parameterized in equation
(13).
The quantities W„
,
V/^
,
and 6 are the major parameters of the
model , and they are specified below as functions of the exogenous
variables. The parameter ^^ is particularly important in the
investigation of the effect of changes in the minimum wage on
collective bargaining outcomes because it represents the initial
wage demand of the union in the sense that a wage change of at
least W_ is necessary in order to avert a strike. The empirical
specifications for W„ , W^ , and 6 are discussed below.
In order to derive the optimal wage strike combination for
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the firm to select, it is assumed that the firm has a present
value function which can be written as
V = / {R - WL[1 + W(S))}e '^"'^dt (14)
S
where R represents the revenues of the firm, WL represents the
wage bill of the firm prior to the negotiation in question, and r
is the discount rate of the firm. The employer can select the
strike length which maximizes V subject to the constraint provided
by the concession schedule in equation (13). Integration of
equation (14) yields
V ^{R - WL[1 + W(S)] }e "^^ (15)
which is differentiated with respect to S after substituting for
W(S) from equation (13), Setting the result equal to zero and
solving for S yields an optimal strike length of
1
„ . -i-- fi ^ **]S = ^ £n
[1 + ^]nVo - WJ
; } + ^1 (16)
WL
where H =
p which is labor's share of revenues. The c, is a
random component which captures unmeasured aspects of the process
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Figure 1 contains a graphical representation of the wage-
strike outcomes under this model. The curve which is convex to
the origin is the union's concession schedule, and the family of
concave curves are iso-present value curves for the firm. The
firm attempts to reach the iso-present value curve closest to the
origin, but it is constrained by the fact that it must be on the
concession schedule (be acceptable to the union). Thus, the
solution is the point of tangency between the concession schedule
and an iso-present value curve. If the concession schedule is
steeper than the iso-present value curves everywhere in the first
quadrant then there will be no strike. This is the case where the
union does not concede fast enough, even initially, for a strike
to be worthwhile to the firm.
Algebraically, if there is no strike then the relationship
defining the optimal strike length in equation (16) do not hold
exactly. Specifically, there is no strike if
S = > i- Zn{— J } + e, . (17)
Suppose that equation (13) also contains a random component
(unknown to the firm) so that it can be written as
W(S) = W^ + (Wq - W^)e ^^ + z^ . (18)
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If there is no strike the firm will grant the minimum wage change
necessary to avert a strike. This is W(0) = Wq + Sg which is,
aside from the random component, the union wage demand.
In order to derive a likelihood function appropriate to this
model it is assumed that e. and Eg have a joint normal
distribution with mean vector zero, and a covariance matrix of
pa.
^2 \ 2 ''
I
where a^ and a„ represent the variances of
P^l ^2 ^^2 /
e- and e^, respectively and p represents the correlation between c.
and £„. From equations (16) and (18) the contribution to the
likelihood function (L. ) where a strike occurs is simply the
appropriate bivariate normal probability density function
(f(«, •)) evaluated at e^ = S - Z and £„ = W - Z„ where
-l
- [1 + tj
^ = - 4-^M-^^^ r-TT' -J ^^^^
and
[1 + -^][Wq - WJ
^2 ^ ^* ^ (^0 - ^*^^
^^*
^^^^^
This contribution is
L. = f(S. - Z, .
,
W. - Z„. ) (21)1 ^ 1 li ' 1 2i ^ ^ ^
where i indexes observations.
Where a strike does not occur the contribution to the
likelihood function is a bivariate normal expression which is
truncated in one dimension. From equations (17) and (18) this is
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-Z .
Li = / fC^i.
^i
- Z2i)dEi. (22)
which is the joint probability density that e. < - Z- . and e^
w. - z„.
.
1 2i
The log-likelihood function for the model derived here is
"l
log L = E Xn[f(S^ - Z^., W. - Z^.)]
i = l
n -Z .
+ E Zn[j ^ f(e^, W. - Z^^)(ie^] (23)
i=n,+l -«>
where strikes occurred in the first n^ observations and did not
occur in the last n-n^ observations.
Note that implementation of this model requires data on
labor's share of total costs (H) which is a central element of Zg-
Unfortunately, these data were available only for the first
fifteen firms listed in Table 2. The four firms for which these
data were not available are those with base wage rates which are
closest to the minimum wage. None of the remaining fifteen firms
has a base wage which is within even 25 percent of the minimum on
average over the sample period. Given the results in Section II
which suggest that the effect of changes in the minimum wage on
wage outcomes is small even for low wage relationships and that
this effect falls as the wage increases, analysis of the data
from the remaining fifteen relatively high wage relationships
concerning the role of W in the collective bargaining process may
m
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prove difficult. Any conclusions drawn from this analysis must be
considered tentative. Nonetheless, the model is estimated over
the 159 observations of the first fifteen relationships.
In order to complete the specification of the model,
empirical constructs for the unobservable quantities W„ , W^^ , and 5
must be developed. While this is done in a somewhat arbitary
manner, attention is paid to reasonable interpretations of the
roles of these parameters in the model. The quantity W„
represents union wage demands. It is specified to be a linear
function of the observable characteristics that were hypothesized
to affect union wage demands in section III. This function is W
= XB where B is a vector of unknown parameters and the X vector
includes a constant, UR, RWCH
,
(NES)p
,
(ES)p
,
W„
,
(W - W„ )
,
(W^- W„)A, G, PHI, PH3, and NRET. With the exception of NRET,
m n
all of these variables were included in the earlier OLS
analysis of wage outcomes. The variable NRET is included to
reflect the possibility that union wage demands may be higher
where the profit rate of the firm is high. Once again, the
variables W^^
,
(W^ "
^h ^ ' ^^^ ^^m ~ ^H -* ^ ^^^ included in order to
measure the effect of changes in the reference wage on union wage
demands. It is the coefficients of these three variables which
will play a central role in the evaluation of the effect of
changes in the minimum wage on bargaining outcomes.
The empirical analogue of W^ is somewhat more complicated.
This quantity is interpreted as the minimum proportional wage
change that the workers will accept in order to return to work
even after a very long strike. More formally, it is the
horizontal asymptote of the union concession schedule. For the
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purpose of this analysis W^ is interpreted here as the wage change
which would make a worker indifferent between staying on his
current union job and taking his best alternative job. In terms
of wage rates this implies that (1 + W^ )W = W. where W represents
the current wage of the worker and W represents his certainty
equivalent alternative wage. With other job characteristics held
constant a worker would quit his job and take a job at W. rather
than accept a wage change of less than W^ . Solving the above
• "A
relationship for W^ yields W^ = —r^— - 1, and it remains to
specify the determinants of the alternative wage. In a manner
analogous to the specification of the reference wage it is assumed
that the alternative wage is proportional to a weighted average of
the minimum wage (W ) and average hourly earnings in durable goods
manufacturing (W„). This is
^A " ^f^% ^ (l-Y)W^] (24)
where K is an arbitrary positive constant and y is the weight
attached to the minimum wage and is a declining function of the
differential (A) between the base wage (W) and the minimum wage.
Let
y = Y^ + y^ A, (25)
where Yp < 0. Substitution for y in equation (24) and
rearrangement of terms yields the result that
^A = ^[^H ^ ^l(^ - ^h) -*- ^2^^ - ^r)^]- (26)
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Using the definition of W^ = —r,— - 1 yields an empirical
specification of
W W - W„ W - W„
^* = Aq + A^
-f- + A^C—%—2-) + AgC "^ y ^ )A. (28)
The parameters A^, A^ , A„, and A„ will be estimated.
Intuitively, this specification suggests that an increase in
the minimum wage will give union workers the opportunity of taking
higher wage alternative jobs. This reduces the total amount which
will be conceded during a strike of a given length and it both
reduces the likelihood of strikes and reduces the optimal duration
of strikes that do occur. ^^ In addition, wage outcomes will be
higher where strikes would have occured due to the negative slope
of the concession schedule. To the extent that higher wage
workers have alternatives which are less closely linked to the
minimum wage (Y2 < 0. A^ < 0) these effects of changing the
minimum wage will be smaller for higher wage workers.
It is interesting to note at this point that while a change
in the minimum may have a positive effect on wage changes and
strike activity through its effect on union wage demands, the
above discussion suggests that some wage outcomes will be higher
and the likelihood of a strike will be lower if the minimum wage
rises due to the positive effect of a change in W on the
m
alternative wage available to workers. Thus, according to this
model the effect of an increase in the minimum wage on wage
outcomes is unambiguously positive, but the effect of an increse
in W^ on strike activity Is Indeterminate.
-41-
The final empirical construct needed in order to estimate the
model is the parameter 6 governing the rate of concession of the
workers. This is hypothesized to be
6 = Cq + C^H (29)
where labor's share of total cost (H) has a negative effect on the
rate of concession (C^ < 0). It is argued that where labor is
important in production (proxied by a large H) a strike will be
more likely to be successful in closing down an employer's
operation, and where a strike is effective the workers will
recognize this and hold back concessions. Where a strike is
relatively ineffective workers may become discouraged and concede
more quickly. ^o
Rather than estimate employer discount rates, which are
likely to vary over the sample period, Moody's averge yield on
corporate bonds for the year of negotiation was selected as an
empirical proxy. This completes the specification of the model
and we turn now to its estimation.
The log-likelihood function defined in equation (23) was
maximized over the sample of 150 observations using the algorithm
described in Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman (1974). Twentynine
of the negotiations represented in the sample ended in a strike.
The mean duration of a strike where one occurred was .126 years.
The parameters estimated include the vectors B, A, and C which are
the coefficients of the empirical constructs for W^ , W^ , and 6
respectively as well as the elements of the covariance matrix of
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o 2
the errors (a- , a , p). The results are contained in Table 8.
-L "4
The estimates of the parameter vector B which determines the
union wage demand is, with two exceptions, similar to the
relationship which determines the wage outcomes (W ) contained in
the first column of Table 5. The first difference is that the
rate of change of real wages over the last contract (RWCH) has a
much stronger negative effect on wage demands than on wage
outcomes. The coefficient on RWCH in the W^ equation is
significantly less than zero at the .001 level.
The second difference between the determinants of W„ and the
determinants of W concerns the effect of changes in the minimum
n
^
wage. The estimates of the effect of '^ on union wage demands do
not support even the relatively small effect, found in Table 5, of
'^ on wage outcomes. One potential explanation for this is that
the sample in this section does not include the four relatively
low wage relationships which might be expected to be most affected
by changes in the minimum wage. However, this explanation is
weakened by the fact that in the OLS regression of W contained in° n
the first column of table 5 the coefficient (standard error) on
(W
-Wtt ) is .0492 for the full sample while the identical equation
(.0380)
estimated over the fifteen firm sample yields a qualitatively
similar coefficient on (W - W ) of .0673. Likewise, the
" (.0628)
coefficient on (W -W„)A is -.0515 for the full sample and
™ " (.0497)
-.0758 for the fifteen firm sample. The other OLS coefficients
(.0731)
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also do not differ substantially between the fifteen and nineteen
firm samples.
Another potential explanation is that, while changes in the
minimum wage affect wage outcomes, the mechanism through which
this occurs is not via wage demands but through some other route.
Indeed, an examination of the estimates contained in Table 8 of
the determinants of the ultimate minimum acceptable wage change
(W^) suggests that the level of the minimum wage relative to the
base wage plays a significant role in the determination of W^
.
The first column of Table 9 contains estimates of the effect of
W
changes in
—^— on W^ . ^ ^ These results show that the effect of
W
m •
changes in —r^— on W^ is significantly positive at the ten
percent level for all values of A < 1 . As expected the magnitude
of the effect is significantly larger in relatively low wage
relationships which reflects the notion that minimum wage jobs are
more important alternatives for workers in low wage jobs than they
are for workers in high wage jobs.
This effect of the minimum wage is due to the level of the
minimum wage relative to the base wage rather than to changes in
that level. Thus, when the minimum wage increases the ratio
W
—=r increases. This will result in an increase in W^ which will
yield somewhat higher wage settlements and perhaps fewer strikes.
At the same time the higher wage increase will reduce the ratio
W
m •
—Tj— which will offset the original change in W^ . Thus, the
effect of a change in W on the negotiated rate of change of wages
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will be temporary although the level of wages will be permanently
increased.
It is interesting that the level of W^^ is not nearly as
important a determinant of ^^ as is the level of W . The second
dW^
column of Table 9 contains estimates of —r^— computed for
W
H
various values of A. The results suggest that —rr— has a
substantial effect on W^ only in relatively high wage
relationships. This is in contrast to the importance of changes
in W„ in the determination of union wage demands.
It must be noted that a strict interpretation of the
* * A
specification of W^ as W^ = —r^— - 1 where W is defined in
equation (26) is not supported by the results. This model has the
clear implication that the constant (A_) in the W^ equation ought
to be -1. However, the point estimate of A contained in table 8
is -.189 with an asymptote standard error of .0999, and the
hypothesis that A„ = -1 can be rejected at any reasonable level of
significance. This suggests that there are substantial nonwage
benefits to staying in a current job which are not proportional to
the wage rate. Nonetheless, the results are supportive of the
general notion that alternative wages are affected by the levels
of the minimum wage and of W„ relative to the base wage.
Overall, the results contained in this section suggest that
changes in the minimum wage do not have an important effect on
union wage demands. However, the evidence suggests tentatively
-45^
that the minimum wage may be an important determinant of the wage
on alternative jobs available to the workers. This has important
implications for the outcome of collective bargaining in the
context of the model developed here. An increase in the minimum
wage relative to the base wage reduces the amount by which the
union will ultimately concede. This will translate into
higher wage increases in cases where strikes would have occurred
had W not changed and perhaps into less strike activity. Given
the complex nature of the model it is difficult to quantify these
effects, but the analysis contained in previous sections found a
small and statistically significant effect of W on negotiated
wage changes in relatively low wage firms. No relationship could
be found between changes in the minimum wage and the level of
strike activity. The analysis contained in this section does not
require that these conclusions be modified.
VI . Summary and Conclusions
The major empirical finding of this study is that changes in
the minimum wage have an effect on negotiated wage changes which
is quite small and, given the precision with which it is
estimated, which is unlikely to be of substantial magnitude. Even
for relationships with base wage rates only 10 percent above the
minimum wage the elasticity of union wages with respect to a
change in the minimum is less than .05. This small effect
declines further as the base wage increases relative to the
minimum.
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No systematic relationship could be found between changes in
the minimum wage and the likelihood or duration of strikes.
However, the results were rather poorly determined, and further
theoretical and empirical analysis of the determinants of strike
activity in general is needed before conclusions can be drawn with
confidence.
In order to investigate a potential mechanism through which
changes in the minimum wage might affect the outcomes of
collective bargaining, an Ashenfelter-Johnson type model of
outcomes was developed and implemented. However, data constraints
forced the elimination of the four lowest wage relationships from
the sample which reduced its usefulness in an investigation of the
effects of W . Nonetheless, two interesting tentative results
m ' ^
relating to the minimum wage were found. First, no systematic
relationship could be found between changes in the minimum wage
and union wage demands while changes in the AHE measure was found
to have a substantial impact on union wage demands.
The second result relating to the minimum wage has broader
implications. It was found in the context of the model that the
level of the minimum wage relative to the base wage is an
important determinant of the alternative wage available to
workers. Since this quantity governs the ultimate concessions the
union will make, it can have an important effect on outcomes.
More specifically, it is likely that a change in the minimum wage
increases wage settlements somewhat in situations where strikes
would have occurred until the base wage rises to reassert
partially the old union-minimum wage differential. There
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may also be a reduction in strike activity. The broader
implication comes from the fact that this effect of the minimum
wage on wage alternatives is largely a function of the level of
the minimum relative to the base wage rather than changes in that
level. This suggests that, while changes in the minimum wage may
have a temporary and relatively minor effect on negotiated wage
changes, the existence of a minimum wage which is set
substantially above the "market" wage may fundamentally alter the
distribution of alternative wages available to union workers. The
result will be a higher union wage structure than would exist in
the absence of a minimum wage. This study has focused on marginal
changes in the minimum wage, and, while the effects of such
changes on union wage changes seem small, the discrete change
implied by the existence of the minimum wage may have had a
somewhat larger effect.
Overall, given the relatively small effect of changes in the
minimum wage and the relatively large effect of changes in average
hourly earnings on union negotiated wage changes, it is likely
that changes in AHE are dominant in the determination of both
changes in the reference wage and the changes in the union
negotiated wage rate. In addition, it can be argued that
legislated changes in the minimum wage are a result of changes in
average hourly earnings as well.^^ Thus, even the small and
seemingly independent effect of W on union negotiated wage
changes may be indirectly a result of changes in average hourly
earnings
.
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FOOTNOTES
^Cox and Oaxaca (1980) develop a general equilibrium model of
wages and employment where unions and a minimum wage are present
which they use to analyze this issue.
^The particular wage rate selected is that for .janitors, or, if
that was not available, the plant minimum regular wage.
^The plant minimum regular wage is the minimum non-starting wage
paid to workers in the plant.
W - W
'^This differential is A =
^
where W represents the base
m
wage and W represents the minimum wage.
^Note that twelve autoregressions for each year from 1954 through
1979 had to be estimated for a total of 312 estimating equations.
^Various ARIMA models were also estimated, but the moving average
seemed to be of little consequence.
^All of the analyses reported below were also carried out using
average hourly earnings in manufacturing as a whole and in all
cases the results were virtually identical to those obtained using
average hourly earnings in durable goods manufacturing.
^The unconstrained SSE is .0989 while the constrained SSE is .112.
The number of constraints is 5, and the appropriate test statistic
-!o . »112 - .0989 196 , ^ „„ K- u ^- ^ -v, 4- ^IS ( 0989 * ~"^ ^ ~ ^'^^ which distributed as
F(5,196). The critical value of the F(5, 196) distribution at the
5 percent level is approximately 2.25.
^This explanation was suggested by Robert Gordon. '
i°The unconstrained SSE is .097 while the constrained SSE is .112.
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The number of constraints is 5, and the appropriate test statistic
1 1
o
_ o')7 198i^ i— ^(^r)7 • —^— ) = 3-^ which is distributed as F(:3,
198). The critical value of the F(3, 198) distribution at the 1
percent level is approximately 3.8.
^^The constrained SSE is .090 while the constrained SSE is .097.
The number of constraints is 8, and the appropriate test statistic
097 - 090 189is (—
^
-^^^
)(
—
g
—
) = 1.81 which is distributed as F(8,
189). The critical value of the F(8, 189) distribution at the 5
percent level is 2.0.
^ ^Tlie unconstrained SSE is .091 while the constrained SSE is .097.
The number of constraints is 18, and the appropriate test
statistic is ( '^^^
ogi^^"*"
— )( ^^ ) = -649 which is distributed
as F(18, 180). The critical value of the F(18, 180) distribution
as the 5 percent level is approximately 1.65.
^^See Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) and Farber (1978) for more
detailed developments of this model.
^'This will be true if the concession rule for the union relates
to some proportion of the total demand.
^ ^The separate variables used before for the Kennedy-Johnson
guidelines and the Nixon-Ford guidelines were computationally
infeasible in the strike model because no strikes took place
during one of the Nixon-Ford subperiods. This resulted in the
parameter associated with that variable being unbounded.
^^The log-likelihood value of the constrained model is -53.9 which
compares with the unconstrained log-likelihood of -49.5. The
number of constraints is 5 and the quantity -2(-53.9 - (49.5)) =
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8.8 is distributed as x (5). The critical value of the x (5)
distribution at the .1 level of significance is 9.24.
^^The log-likelihood value of the constrained model is -53.9 which
compares with the unconstrained log-likelihood of -47.9. The
number of constraints is 8 and the quantity -2(-53.9 - (-47.9)) =
2 2
12. is distributed as x (8). The critical value of the x (8)
distribution at the .1 level of significance is 13.4.
^^The log-likelihood of the constrained model is -49.5 which
compares to an unconstrained log-likelihood of -47.9. The number
of constraints is 3 and the quantity -2(-49.5 - (-47.9)) = 3.2 is
2 2distributed as x (3). The critical value of the x (3)
distribution at the .25 level is 4.11.
^^In formal terms this can be demonstrated by differentiating
equation (16), which defines the strike length and governs the
likelihood of a strike, with respect to W^ . The result is
^3 - tiilV ,„.
'^^*
(-r- - (1 + w^))(Wo - w*)
This expression is positive because W„ > W^ and because it must
1be true that > (1 + W ) for the union wage demand to notH U
absorb more than total revenues
.
20lt is interesting to contrast this to the role of labor's share
that is built in to the model through the employer's objective
function. In that context a large share for labor suggests
that the costs of any concession will be larger and that foregone
profits during a strike will be relatively smaller. These two
roles for labor's share are analogous to two of Marshall's four
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conditions for a low elasticity of derived demand for labor.
First, it is "important to be unimportant" in the sense that a
small share of costs makes the elasticity of derived demand for
labor smaller. Second, it is "important to be indispensible" in
the sense that substitute factors of production may not be readily
available. See Rees (1962).
W
2iThe computations do not consider the effect of changes on tt^— on
W - W
A. While strictly speaking this is not correct because A = —tj^——
m
it is appropriate for this analysis. This is because A is
included to represent the mix of alternative jobs available to the
individual, and the goal of the analysis is to determine how a
change in W affects the wages paid for a fixed set of alternative
jobs. The change in the minimum wage should have only a second
order effect on the mix of actual jobs available.
^^A rudimentary probit model of the probability of a legislated
change in the minimum wage occuring during a particular year
yields the tentative result that the legislature amends the Fair
Labor Standards Act to raise W in response to a deterioration of
m
the minimum wage relative to average hourly earnings in
manufacturing (W). The model is specified as
Pr(L = 1) = Pr(0Q + B^ -J- + e^ > 0)
m
where L = 1 if the legislature raises the minimum wage and e. has
a standard normal distribution. The model is estimated over the
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26 year period from 1954-1979, and years with programmed changes
are included as years with no legislative action (L = 0) at the
new programmed minimum wage. Legislated changes took place in
five of the twentysix years. The maximum likelihood estimates of
the parameters are Bp, = -11.1 and 6-. = 4.46 where the numbers in
(2.03) (2.34)
parentheses are asymptotic standard errors, and log L = -8.98.
Care must be taken in interpreting the results due to the small
sample size and overly simplistic analysis. The results suggest
that indeed the probability of a legislated increase in the
W
minimum wage is higher where —rs— is higher. Certainly a more
m
careful analysis of this problem would be useful.
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Number Firm
Table 1: The Sample
Union
6
7
10
American Cyanamid
Armour
Atlantic Richfield
Boeing
Firestone
FMC
General Electric
General Motors
International Paper
Interco
(International Shoe)
11 PPG
12 Rockwell
International
13 Simmons
14 U.S. Steel
15 Weyerhauser
16 Berkshire -Hathaway
17 Dan River-Mills
18 Massachusetts Shoe
Manufacturing
(Association
)
19 New York City
Laundries
(Association)
International Chemical Workers
Union
Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher
Workmen of North America
Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers
International Union
International Association of
Machinists
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, and
Plastic Workers of America
Textile Workers Union of America
International Union of Electrical,
Radio, and Machine Workers
United Automobile, Aircraft, and
Agricultural Implement Workers
of America (UAW)
United Paperworkers International
Union
International Boot and Shoe Workers
United Glass and Ceramic Workers
UAW
Union of International Upholsterers
United Steel Workers of America
International Woodworkers of
America
Textile Workers Union of America
United Textile Workers of America
United Shoe Workers of America
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America
Table 2: Average Differentials Between the Base Wage
and the Minimum Wage Prior to Negotiation of Each Contract
over the 1954-1979 Period
Firm
1 American Cyanamid
2 Armour
3 Atlantic Richfield
4 Boeing
5 Firestone
6 FMC
7 General Electric
8 General Motors
9 International Paper
10 International Shoe
11 PPG
12 Rockwell
13 Simmons
14 U.S. Steel
15 Weyerhauser
16 Berkshire-Hathaway
17 Dan River Mills
18 Massachusetts Shoe
19 NYC Laundries
Total
Number of Average
Contracts Differential*
16 .45
10 1.17
15 1.07
10 .99
14 1.28
9 .65
7 .29
8 1.32
14 .83
11 .31
9 .95
9 .94
8 .39
8 .95
11 1.02
11 .16
20 .12
11 .13
8 .10
209 .68
*The differential is
is the minimum wage.
W - W
m
W
m
where W is the base wage and W
m
Table 3: Means and Standard Deviations of Data
Variable Definition
W„ Negotiated annual rate of wage change
Wm
W
me
n
W Base wage on expiration of old contract
Minimum wage prevailing at negotiation
Minimum wage expected to prevail at end
of contract (W^^ + programmed changes)
Wrt Average hourly earnings in durable goods
manufacturing
P Expected annual rate of inflation
UR Civilian unemployment rate
'^^'male Prime-age male unemployment rate
P^ Annual rate of inflation over last
contract
Mean
.0551
2.32
1.38
1.44
S.D.
.0294
1.13
.472
.504
3.25 1 .23
.0351,. .0254
.0558 .0372
.0351 .0122
,0345 0296
Wj^ Annual rate of change of base wage over
last contract (including cost of living
escalator)
RWCH Annual rate of change of real wages over
last contract (Wj^ - P-^)
Differential between W and V! (-
W - W
"¥
m
m
)
.0570
.0225
.680
.0304
.0263
.458
^H Average annual rate of change of W^ over
last contract
tt^^ Average annual rate of change of W^ over
last contract
W Am m *A
.0516
.0573
.0337
.0221
.0775
.0619
WhA Wf^*A
ES ES = 1 if contract does not contain cost-
of-living escalator, NES = otherwise
.0364
.220
.0348
Table 3: (continued) Means and Standard Deviations of Data
Variable Definition Mean S.D.
NES NES = 1 if contract does not contain
cost-of-living escalator, NES =
otherwise .220
G G = 1 if contract negotiated during
Kennedy-Johnson guidelines, G =
otherwise .206
PHI PHI = 1 if contract negotiated during
Phases I or II of Nixon-Ford controls,
PHI = otherwise .0381
PH3 PH3 = 1 if contract negotiated during
Phases III or IV of Nixon-Ford controls,
PH3 = otherwise .0526
CON CON = 1 if G = 1 or PHI = 1 or PH3 = 1
,
CON = otherwise
H^ Labor's Share of Total Costs
NRET^ Net Rate of Return on Firm's Assets of
time of negotiation
r^ Moody's Average Yield on Corporate Bonds
n = 209
^Uses duration of new contract to compute rate
Over the 159 observations of Relationships 1-15.
.297
.292 .0932
.122 .0584
.0580 .0204
Table 4: OLS Regression of W^^ (Equation 7)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficient of: 1954-1979 1954-1970 1954-1979 1954-1979
Constant .0353 .0316 .0561 .0541
(.00443) ( .00759) (.00592) (.00579)
UR .0906 .0827 .154
( .0448) (.0404) (.0446)
URmale -.535
(.142)
-.685
(.145)
RWCH -.0873 -.181 -.0663 -.0634
( .0654) (.0807) ( .0641) (.0624)
(NES) Pg .649 .855 .754 .728
C7
(.0814) (.297) (.0810) (.0792)
(ES) P .250 .428 .320 .297
tJ
(.0833) (.311) ( .0816) (.0798)
G -.0127 -.0108 -.0136 -.0159
(.00432) (.00394) ( .00422) (.00417)
PHI
-.00586
(.00859)
-.00988
( .00845)
-.0110
(.00824)
ir il J.
PH3 .00913
( .00746)
.000613
( .00754)
.0000786
( .00735)
IT il kJ
r2 .381 .163 .411 .444
SEE .0236 .0211 .0231 .0224
N 209 150 209
(The numbers in parentheses are standard errors)
!09
Table 5: OLS Regression on W (Equation 9)
Coefficient
of:
Basic Model
(1)
Firm Fixed Programmed Changes
< 1970 Effects in W
(2) (3) (4)"^
Constant 00931 .00621
(.00924)
.00909
( .00634)
. \JKJ ^ kJ 1.
( .00632)
UR .103 .101 .0986 .102
( .0420) ( .0386) ( .0448) ( .0421)
RWCH -.0528 -.110 -.0637
-.0444
( .0632) ( .0785) ( .0655) (.0634)
(NES) P^ .194 .634 .177 .177
(.115) ( .294) (.123) (.115)
(ES) f> -.210 .189 -.123 -.227
'C;
(.117) (.310) (.127) (.117)
^H .748 .602 .700 .765
(.140) (.163) (.146) (.141)
^m - ^H .0492 .0854 .0509 .0255
(.0380) ( .0425) ( .0389) (.0324)
(^m - %)^ -.0515 -.0933 -.0547 -.00755Jll 11
(.0497) (.0612) ( .0509) (.0371)
G -.00152 -.00202 -.00193 -.00146
(.00454) (.00431) ( .00472) (.00455)
PHI -.0150
( .00858)
-.0131
( .00902)
-.0155
(.00851)
PH3 .00193
( .00742)
.00325
( .00776)
.00301
( .00737)
FIRM FIXED
EFFECTS NO NO YES NO
R^
SEE
,464
,0221
.267
.0199
.497
.0225
.463
.0222
N 209 150 209 209
(The numbers in parentheses are standard errors)
Table 6:
dC dW,
d*m ' ^*H
,
and a
at various wage levels relative to the minimum wage (A)
dW, a
dW,
m
dW
n
dWH
.049
( .038)
.699
(.147)
.066
.1 .044
(.034)
.704
( .146)
.059
.039
( .031)
.709
( • 145 )
.052
.4 .029
( .025)
.719
(.143)
.038
.6 .018
( .022)
.729
(.142)
.024
.8 .008
(.024)
.740
(.142)
.011
1. -.002
(.049)
.750
(.143)
-.003
1.5 -.028
(.049)
.776
(.147)
-.038
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. These numbers
are derived from the estimates in the first column of table 5
a) B(^ + ByA c) B B.
Bf^5^'
b) B^ - Bg - By/
Table 7: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of
Tobit Model of Strike Length
(Equation 12)
Coefficient
of: (1) (2)
Constant -.0715 .0339
(.0950) (.114)
UR -.0253 -.140
(.126) (1.52)
RWCH -1.58 -1.89
(1.15) (1.12)
(NES) f>g -3.41 -1.31
(1.59) (2.51)
(ES) f>g -1.14 .999
(1.59) (2.47)
CON -.0443 -.0725
(.0564) (.0580)
Wj^ -3.00
(2.22)
(*m - *h) --227
(.786)
(W^ - W5^)A -.0411
(1.06)
a^ .0451 .0430
(.0173) (.0169)
Log L -49.5 -47.9
N 209 209
(The Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors)
Table 8: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of
Two Equation Structural Model
.
W,
Coefficient of: Coefficient of Coefficient of:
Constant .0190
( .00938)
Constant -.189
(.0999)
Constant 2.56
( .518)
UR .106
( .0776) W
-
.283
(1.63)
H -3.27
( .936)
RWCH -.183
( .0588)
^m
- Wh
w
.344
(.215)
(NES)
(ES)
^e
.255
(.115)
-.133
(.100)
Wm -.135
(.0725)
% .703
(.154)
^l' .125
( .0598)
(K- %) -.00485
(.0662)
02' .000477
(.0000528)
(\ - <^h)^ -.0153
(.0799)
P .317
(.144)
G -.00285
(.00569)
PHI -.0160
(.0244)
PH3 -.00311
( .0109)
NRET -.0270
(.0388)
(The numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.)
n = 159
L = 331.3
Table 9: —yy— and —^— at various wage
d(TfSL-) d(^)
levels relative to the minimum wage (A).
dW* ^) dW* b)
d(/^) d(Tr-)
.344 -.0617
(.215) (.0554)
.1 .331 -.0482
(.209) (.0497)
.2 .317 -.0347
(.202) (.0445)
.4 .290 -.0077
(.188) (.0362)
.6 .263 .0193
(.175) (.0325)
.8 .236 .0463
(.162) (.0351)
1. .209 .0733
(.149) (.0427)
1.5 .142 .141
(.119) (.0717)
Note: The numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.
These numbers are derived from the estimates in table 8
ignoring changes in A.
a) A2 + A3A b) A^ + A2 - A3A
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